2024 and Beyond: Building The EU’s Defense and Security Capacity
During the 20th annual Halifax International Security Forum in November, a U.S. delegation of five Senators and one Member of the House of Representatives observed that, despite chaos in Congress and arguments over aid to Ukraine, “they didn’t hear any skepticism about American resolve behind closed doors.” Many EU politicians and officials display a similar confidence in American support. In October, as EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Josep Borell acknowledged that the EU could not replace U.S. support for Ukraine, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte expressed his conviction “that the U.S. will stay on board.”
Not everyone shares this faith. Early in December, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer claimed during an interview that Europe needs its own nuclear deterrent. Manfred Weber, the German leader of the European People’s Party, voiced his support for the idea and advocated for EU states to accept a 2020 offer from President Macron to transform France’s nuclear arsenal into a European deterrent. However, despite some calls for a more independent approach, the general European sentiment is clear: Washington remains a reliable partner.
Unfortunately, this sentiment is evident in the current state of European militaries. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost two years ago, sparking a fundamental rethink of European security. Defense spending surged across Europe, with NATO estimating that from 2022 to 2023, defense spending among European members of the Alliance grew by over 8 percent. Moreover, NATO estimates that every European NATO member allocated 20 percent of military expenditures (the NATO minimum) to major equipment in 2023. Nonetheless, European militaries look eerily similar to 2022. Britain has fewer than 150 combat-ready tanks, France possesses fewer than 90 heavy artillery pieces, and Germany has enough ammunition for only two days of combat. This reality echoes earlier episodes. In August 2022, Madrid admitted that, despite having suggested providing Leopard tanks to Ukraine in June, the condition of the Leopards actually made them unusable. Similarly, the critical shortage of German ammunition had already become known in late 2022.
Even in crisis management, where the EU has set ambitious goals, such as the new Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) outlined by the EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass, problems remain. According to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in early 2023, the EU is still missing key air domain enablers, such as airlift capacity, tactical command and control (C2), operational C2, and aerial refueling. Moreover, although the EU has begun testing the RDC with military exercises, it remains unclear if the RDC will reach operationality by the Strategic Compass's target date of 2025.
There has been some progress in EU defense policy: defense budgets have grown, and Brussels has launched a surge of initiatives. The European defense industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) provides funding to incentivize EU states to procure defense equipment jointly, thereby reducing waste and creating economies of scale for the defense industrial base. The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) provides funding for rapid capacity reconstruction for manufacturing ammunition. And while the RDC is running behind schedule, it conducted the EU’s first-ever military exercise. However, at the end of the day, the EU remains as dependent on the United States for security and defense as it was before the war in Ukraine.
This state of affairs leaves the EU vulnerable to the turbulence of American politics, and not only in the context of Ukraine. As the U.S.’s rivalry with China intensifies, Washington will provide less leadership and military support for regional crises. Therefore, the EU’s dependence on Washington creates a severe strategic weakness that extends beyond the Russian threat. Fischer and Weber have recognized this problem but chose the wrong remedy. France’s nuclear arsenal is minuscule compared to Russia’s and less diversified than the United States, leaving Europe with far fewer options to respond. Transforming France’s nuclear arsenal into a European deterrent would require significant funds, time, and institutional reforms. Such a transformation would be impossible before next year’s U.S. presidential election.
Instead, the EU needs to devote the political will and financial means necessary for rebuilding the European defense industrial base, establishing the EU’s crisis management capacity, and strengthening conventional military capabilities. These reforms will put the EU in the best possible position to secure its interests in the event of a second Trump presidency and to mitigate the worst possibilities for the Transatlantic relationship.
These changes won’t alter the EU’s ultimate dependence on the United States for nuclear deterrence or conventional support, given that EU states are unlikely to generate massive standing armies. For example, Germany’s military has around 180,000 troops, despite a yearslong effort to increase its size, whereas Moscow wants to set its military at 1.32 million. However, these steps will give the EU more maneuverability and stability. Moreover, such moves might be less contentious inside the EU. Proposals for an EU nuclear deterrent could create unease among Central European states that see the United States as their ultimate security guarantor.
In contrast, defense industrial policy and crisis management present an area where progress is possible and immediately necessary. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of production capacity, with the EU’s ammunition production at the beginning of the war barely surpassing what Ukraine uses in a month. Moreover, areas on the EU’s periphery, like the Balkans, remain unstable, and a functional crisis response will enable the EU to respond without relying on American political willingness to provide critical capabilities and leadership.
While it is difficult to know precisely how a second Trump administration would craft its Europe policy, Trump’s most significant criticism against NATO was always that European allies were free riders, profiting from American largesse while contributing nothing in return. Thus, Trump’s most frequent target was Berlin, the economic giant that neglected defense obligations. However, previous administrations have had similar complaints, and as Washington faces strategic tradeoffs, the EU needs to show progress on defense, or it risks alienating even transatlantic-friendly administrations.
Finding the financial means for this will require hard choices in EU capitals. The European Commission projected economic growth of only 0.6 percent in 2023 and 1.3 percent in 2024. Moreover, EU members must balance procurement priorities between urgent, off-the-shelf procurement and the imperative of providing long-term planning stability for European defense industries. EU states will also need to balance crisis management capabilities with the primacy of territorial defense. Furthermore, Ukraine’s war effort still requires support. However, as the 2024 election approaches and Europe Remains deeply insecure, the EU needs to recognize that defense is not an area where it can afford to fall down.
Author: Ian Cameron
Managing Editor: Sebastian Reyes
Web Editor: Matthew MacKenzie
